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ARGUMENT
Introduction
Barbuto does not dispute that a physician who makes unauthorized and/or false
disclosures about a former patient's medical condition for the physician's personal gain
may be subject to liability. As discussed in Sorensens' initial brief, most courts recognize
a cause of action under such circumstances, usually under one or more of the following
theories:

1) breach of implied contract; 2) breach of confidentiality and/or fiduciary

duties, and 3) invasion of privacy. {See Brief of Appellants at 12).
Utah courts have likewise recognized for half a century that physicians are
fiduciaries and owe duties of confidentiality to their patients. {Id. at 21). In light of this
established authority, Barbuto's statement that "Sorensens admit they are attempting to
create new law" is perplexing. {See Appellees' Brief at 6). The law is fairly clear; the
only issue is whether the allegations of Sorensens' complaint, and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn therefrom, state a claim under any theory of liability.
In arguing that they do not, Barbuto offers several contentions. Before addressing
those, however, one matter should be clarified. Barbuto implies on several occasions that
Sorensens' claim is based upon the disclosure of Nicholas Sorensens' medical records.
{See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 4, 17 "Confidentiality of a patient's medical records is not
absolute," 32 ("Dr. Barbuto was not the source of disclosure of Nicholas's confidential
medical records"), and 38 ("The release of Dr. Barbuto's medical records for Mr.
Sorensen resulted from Sorensens placing his physical condition at issue")).
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Barbuto also implies that Sorensens' claim is based upon Barbuto's review of
medical records generated by other health care providers, or the mere act of "providing
expert opinions". {See id. at 4, 9 ("Stripped to its legal essentials, Sorensens['] claim
against Dr. Barbuto is that he breached a duty of physician-patient confidentiality by
providing expert opinions on the cause of Nicholas's medical symptoms to counsel
defending against his personal injury claim"), 16, 30 ("the expert opinion is reached in the
sterile review of medical records"), and 32).
Neither suggestion is accurate. Nicholas Sorensen's medical records had already
been provided; no claim is made regarding the records themselves. Likewise, no claim
would likely have resulted if Barbuto had simply provided normal expert service,
reviewing records of other health care providers and rendering opinions thereon.
However, Barbuto was not opining on another health care provider's diagnosis or
treatment of Nicholas Sorensen's condition - Barbuto was changing his own diagnosis.
That is not the function of an expert witness. That is the act of a treating physician.1
What Sorensens actually base their claim on may be broadly summarized in two
areas: 1) Barbuto's discussion of his unwritten impressions and observations regarding
Nicholas Sorensen's medical condition with Sorensen's adversary, ex parte and without
notice, and 2) making false disclosures for financial gain.

As noted in Sorensens' initial brief, opposing counsel's letter retaining Barbuto sought
Barbuto's views, "as [Sorensen's] treating physician early on in his injury, about his
current condition." (Brief of Appellants at 35 n. 7; emphasis added).
2

Barbuto's brief does not address Sorensens' contention that false disclosures, even
if otherwise authorized, constitute a breach of confidentiality. Nor can he - to argue
otherwise would be both counterintuitive and a rather disturbing position for a physician
(or anyone) to take. Accordingly, the allegations in Sorensens' Complaint that Barbuto
made false disclosures state a claim upon which Sorensens may seek relief. This ground
in itself compels reversal of the trial court's order.
In one of several instances where Barbuto recharacterizes Sorensens' arguments
and then argues against his own characterization, Barbuto claims that Sorensens "would
prohibit a physician from testifying truthfully if the truth was adverse to the patient
recovering a monetary judgment." (Appellees' Brief at 24.) Having set up that straw
man, Barbuto then knocks it down by stating that all witnesses should be able to testify
truthfully. That assertion is not only self-evident but ironic, in that a key component of
Sorensens' claims is that Barbuto provided false information for monetary gain.

In a related vein, Barbuto accuses plaintiff of "alleging] irrelevant, inaccurate and
insulting 'facts' relating to Dr. Barbuto's alleged involvement with 'defense attorneys.'"
According to Barbuto, the motives behind his actions should be irrelevant in this case.
(Appellees' Brief at 7). The problem with that assertion is that motives are an important
consideration in several of Sorensens' claims. Motives may negate a defense of honest
mistake. They suggest malice. They support outrageousness for an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim. From a practical perspective, motives are also important at
trial for the simple reason that juries want to understand why parties did what they did.
3

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO IMPLIED
CONTRACT CLAIMS MAY BE MADE AGAINST PHYSICIANS IN
UTAH.

A.

Implied contracts are enforceable against physicians.

Barbuto does not dispute the principle - established in Utah for decades - that an
implied contractual relationship arises as a matter of law in the physician-patient
relationship. Barbuto argues, however, that such a contract is not "legal" (i.e., actionable)
because, by definition, an implied contract is not in writing.
As in the trial court, Barbuto relies on Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6, which provides:
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty,
contract or assurance of result.
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an
alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be
obtained from any health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an
authorized agent of the provider.
In spite of the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 (reinforced by its title)
limiting its scope to guarantees, warranties, contracts or assurances of result, Barbuto
argues that the statute really bars all contract claims. Without analysis, Barbuto ignores
the qualifying words "of result to be obtained" and instead argues that the statute is
without limit, that "no liability based upon a contract" can be enforced unless it is in
writing. (Appellees5 Brief at 10; emphasis added).
This argument cannot withstand review of the statutory language itself, or the
historical context in which it was enacted, which was to curb a specific type of lawsuit
that was gaining popularity in the 1960s and 1970s. (See Brief of Appellants at 14-16).
4

Barbuto omits any mention of the background of the statute, or of the authority cited by
Sorensens addressing similar statutes.
Barbuto next claims that "the [Health Care Malpractice] Act establishes the
legislature's intent that contract claims against a health care provider not be the basis of
independent causes of action." His sole authority for that proposition is the definition of
the phrase "malpractice action against a health care provider," which includes claims
sounding "in contract, tort, breach of warranty," etc. (Appellees' Brief at 10).
Sorensens are unsure how this argument helps Barbuto. If anything, the definition
recognizes that malpractice claims may be based upon contract. The statute does not bar
claims within its scope; it merely requires them to be adjudicated in accordance with its
provisions. The Sorensens went through the pre-litigation medical malpractice process.
Accordingly, Barbuto's theory that "the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act subsumes
contract claims" would not affect the Sorensens' claim in any event.
Although it does not affect Sorensens' entitlement to recovery, it should be noted
that Barbuto's reliance upon the Health Care Malpractice Act would not survive the Utah
Supreme Court's recent decision in Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P.3d 915. In that
case, the court affirmed this Court's ruling that the Act applies only when a breach occurs
"during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Id. (reversing dismissal of
former patient's alienation of affections claim against therapist). Throughout his brief,
Barbuto emphasizes that his physician-patient relationship with Nicholas Sorensen had
ended before his alleged breaches of confidence occurred. (See Appellees' Brief at 3, 4,
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6, 16, 17, 27, 30, 31). Accordingly, none of Sorensens' claims would be subject to the
Act, let alone barred by it.
In sum, Barbuto's contract argument ignores the plain language of Section 78-146, the statute's historical context, and Utah Supreme Court precedent. The trial court's
ruling that no implied contract claims can ever be brought against a physician was
erroneous, and must be reversed.
As a fallback argument, Barbuto attempts to recharacterize Sorensens' argument
so as to fall within Section 78-14-6's prohibitions, arguing: "In short, Sorensens claim
that Dr. Barbuto breached a 'guarantee' to his patient that he would not reveal
confidential information without permission. Alternatively, the allegation is that Dr.
Barbuto 'warranted' that such confidential information would not be disclosed."
(Appellees' Brief at 9). Whatever the merit of rewriting a plaintiffs allegations in
connection with a motion to dismiss, even Barbuto's version would not fall within the
statute's scope: neither claim has anything to do with a guarantee or warranty of a
particular result.
B.

Sorensens sufficiently alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.
Assuming that an implied contract existed between Sorensens and him, Barbuto
says "[t]here is nothing in the complaint which supports an allegation that Dr. Barbuto
agreed not to discuss Nicholas's medical treatment with defense attorneys in the context
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of a personal injury action where he is statutorily privileged to do so." (Appellees' Brief
at 12).
Of course, that recharacterization of the issue begs the question:

Obviously,

Sorensens would not allege (since they do not agree) that Barbuto was "statutorily
privileged" to do what he did. Noting that contracts contain by implication the law that
exists at the time of contracting, Barbuto says he cannot have breached his implied
contractual duties because he was legally entitled to do what he did. (See Appellees'
Brief at 13, citing Utah Rule of Evidence 506 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4).)
There are two problems with that assertion. The first is Barbuto's fundamental
misassumption that a lawful act cannot breach an implied duty of good faith. Years of
Utah precedent hold otherwise. See, e.g., Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28,
94 P.3d 193, Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889
P.2d 445, 451-52, 458 (Utah App.1994), St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) (all recognizing otherwise lawful acts as
violative of the covenant). Any other conclusion would reduce the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to nothing more than the already-existing requirement that a party not do
something illegal.
In any event, Dr. Barbuto's assumption that he was legally permitted to breach
Sorensens' confidence is erroneous. This issue is discussed in the next section.
Barbuto further suggests that a breach of implied contractual duties cannot be
found unless a breach of express provisions has occurred, and that "a party's contractual
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obligations cannot 'be enlarged and expended by means of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually
made.'" (Appellees' Brief at 13-14).
A similar argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Christiansen v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2005 UT 21, 116 P.3d 259. There, the court pointed out
that duties implied by law are not dependent or conditioned upon express duties. In that
case, the plaintiff asserted two claims: one seeking underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits
under an insurance policy, and a second alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by the insurer. Farmers resisted discovery on the bad faith claim while the
contract claim was in arbitration, arguing that the bad faith claim could not proceed until
the plaintiff established a breach of the contract's express terms. Id, Tf 3.
The trial court rejected the defendant's argument, ruling that "the two claims were
independent of each other and could therefore be pursued simultaneously." Id, If 4. The
Supreme Court affirmed, noting that claims for breach of contract and for bad faith are
"premised on distinct duties that give rise to divergent and severable causes of action":
A breach of express contract claim arises out of the express terms of the contract,
and the breach is proven in relation to those terms. . . . A claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by contrast, is based on judicially
recognized duties not found within the four corners of the contract. These duties,
unlike the duties expressly stated in the contract, are not subject to alteration by the
parties.
Id, f 10 (citation omitted).
Barbuto disregards "the subtle but important distinction between invoking the
implied covenant to compel a contracting party to honor the 'agreed common purpose'
8

and 'justified expectations' of another party to the contract, and injecting it to 'establish
new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties' or to 'nullify a right
granted by a contract to one of the parties.'" Eggett, 2004 UT 28, f 44 (Nehring, J.,
concurring; citations omitted). In this case, there is no conflict between the implied duty
of confidentiality and any other duties that Barbuto had.
Whether a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing could be found in
this case will depend, in part, upon the parties' expectations under the contract. In the
context of the implied contract existing between physician and patient, the expectation of
confidentiality has been recognized for thousands of years. See, e.g., the Hippocratic
Oath and the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics. (Brief of Appellants at 18-20). There
can be no dispute that confidentiality is part of a physician's good faith duties.
C.

Sorensens sufficiently alleged contract-based damages.

Acknowledging that a complaint need not establish an evidentiary basis for the
plaintiffs damages, Barbuto nonetheless claims that Sorensens did not allege sufficient
facts to demonstrate "potential damages." Barbuto argues that the Sorensens had to plead
facts from which specific "economic damages" were "contemplated or foreseen by Mr.
Sorensen or Dr. Barbuto." (Appellees' Brief at 15).

Barbuto states that Sorensens are asserting a private right of action from breach of these
long-established medical ethics, and then spends three pages refuting that non-existent
argument. (Appellees' Brief at 27-30). As Sorensens' initial brief indicated, the
relevance of these standards is that they establish the expectations of parties to an implied
contract between physician and patient. (Brief of Appellants at 17-20). Sorensens have
not argued in this appeal that the breach of the standards is in itself actionable, except as
they happen to be coextensive with legal duties and public policy.
9

This argument misstates the actual test. A party need not allege that specific
damages were in fact contemplated or foreseen; it is sufficient if a reasonable inference
may be drawn that such damages were "reasonably within the contemplation of, or
reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Black v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66, % 28, 100 P.3d 1163 (emphasis added). Could Barbuto
reasonably foresee that a breach of his duties might cause the expenditure of attorney fees
and expense, as Sorensens allege in their complaint? How could he not?
Moreover, Barbuto's suggestion that economic loss must be specified to avoid
dismissal is inconsistent with Machan v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America,
2005 UT 37, 116 P.3d 342, and cases cited therein. In Machan, the Utah Supreme Court
reaffirmed that recovery for breach of contract is not limited to economic loss, but may
include emotional distress and similar harm. Id. at ^ 12, 16, 19 n. 2, 30.
As a final note, Sorensens noted in their initial brief (and Barbuto does not dispute)
that their complaint requested equitable relief, and therefore the alleged absence of pled
damages at law would not be a basis for dismissing the complaint anyway. (See Brief of
Appellants at 43 n. 10.)
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO CLAIM CAN
BE MAINTAINED FOR BARBUTO'S ALLEGED BREACH OF
CONFIDENTIALITY AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES.

Barbuto acknowledges that physicians owe their patients a duty of confidentiality
to patients. He also "does not dispute that the physician-patient relationship creates a type
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of fiduciary duty to the patient." (Appellees' Brief at 27).4 In seeking affirmance of the
lower court's dismissal of these claims, Barbuto relies principally upon two arguments.
The first is that "the only confidences which Dr. Barbuto had a duty to preserve
(those related to communications and treatment during his treatment period) were already
disclosed by Nicholas [Sorensen] as part of the personal injury action." (Appellees' Brief
at 16). With respect to this point, Barbuto repeatedly emphasizes that he was no longer
Nicholas Sorensen's physician at the time he made the disclosures.
This argument misses the point.

Sorensens' complaint alleges that, after the

relationship ended, Barbuto improperly disclosed confidential information relating to
communications and treatment that took place before the relationship ended.

Barbuto

does not claim that a physician's duties of confidentiality evaporate upon termination of
the relationship. Barbuto states: "Admittedly, a limited duty of confidentiality survived
that termination, but Sorensens point to no authority that any other duty continued once
the relationship was over." (Appellees' Brief at 27). Given that the heart of Sorensens'

Barbuto says in passing that the Sorensens did not plead fiduciary duties in their
Complaint. (Appellees' Brief at 27). To the contrary, Sorensens' allegations included
that "[professional medical standards regarding the relationship between physicians and
patients outline the fiduciary-type duties owed by defendants to Nicholas Sorensen,
including the duty to work in the best interest of a patient's health to protect the patient's
privacy." (R. 9, Tf 34); see also R. 54 (citing physician's "fiducia[ry]" duties, and alleging
that "the failure to advise Plaintiffs of the revised opinion and disclosure of such opinions
is clearly a breach of the fiduciary duties of a physician"). If Barbuto means to complain
that there was no cause of action specifically labeled 'breach of fiduciary duty,' such
labels are not required under principles of notice pleading. Nor is it a basis to sustain a
motion to dismiss. The court may grant such a motion only if there is no possible set of
facts that would sustain any claim.
11

case is Barbuto's post-termination breach of confidentiality, this acknowledgment is all
Sorensens need to establish their claim, unless Barbuto can prevail on his waiver defense.
On this issue, Sorensens agree that a limited waiver occurs with respect to medical
information when the patient's medical condition is at issue. Sorensens do not agree with
- nor do most recent cases or public policy support - Barbuto's suggestion that there are
no restrictions or duties with regard to a physician's disclosure of medical information to
third parties under such circumstances.
To support his contention that physicians are bound by no restrictions when
disclosing medical information if a patient has filed a personal injury suit, Barbuto first
cites U.R.E. 506. However, that rule addresses only the issue of privilege within the
context of admissibility of evidence. It does not authorize ex parte communications or
the disclosure of confidential information outside a testimonial setting. Moreover, this
Court has already recognized that, even when a limited waiver occurs pursuant to Rule
506, it is not unlimited; a patient must still have notice and a fair opportunity to assert his
privilege. DeBry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, H 27, 999 P.2d 582.
In DeBry, this Court followed the Utah Supreme Court's lead in State v. Cardall,
1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d 79. In Cardall, the court held that an alleged rape victim's medical
records were directly at issue in a criminal case, and therefore the normal physicianpatient privilege was waived pursuant to Rule 506. Significantly, however, the Court did
not allow unfettered disclosure as Barbuto seeks here.

Rather, the court said, "the

defendant does not have the right to examine all of the confidential information or to
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search through state files without supervision." Id., ^ 30 (citation omitted). Before the
defendant could see the records, the court held, an in camera review would have to
establish their materiality. Id.
That some restrictions exist even when a partial waiver exists is thus established in
Utah. The question is: what restrictions? Barbuto says there are none. But under DeBry
and Cardall (and a majority of cases from other jurisdictions), at a minimum, prior notice
to the patient and an opportunity for the patient to protect his rights are required. That
means no ex parte communications (unless the patient has been notified and elected not to
participate).
As noted in Sorensens' initial brief, the modern trend is to deem unauthorized ex
parte disclosures a breach of confidentiality. (Brief of Appellants at 23-30). In an ex
parte setting, the sole responsibility for protecting a patient's rights rests with persons
untrained in the law and with the adversary's attorney. The risk of abuse, whether
inadvertent or otherwise, is palpable.

While this Court need not adopt a particular

investigative method in order to find Barbuto's disclosures actionable, alternatives
include allowing the plaintiffs attorney to be present during interviews, providing a list
of questions prior to an interview, requiring the use of depositions, etc. See id.
In response, Barbuto relies primarily upon a handful of cases that did indeed
decline to impose any restrictions on ex parte contact between physicians and opposing
attorneys. See, e.g., Glenn v. Kerlin, 248 So.2d 834 (La. App. 1971); Brandt v. Medical
Defense Associates, 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Street v. Hedgepath, 607
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A.2d 1238 (D.CApp. 1992); Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952 (Ala. 1984). There are cases
holding as defendant urges—just not many these days.
Additionally, not all of defendant's cited cases have fared well over time. In
Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. 1988), for example, the intermediate
court issued an opinion allowing ex parte communications between physicians and
opposing counsel—which was promptly eviscerated. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
quickly clarified by rule that ex parte contacts are not allowed in that state. P.R.Civ.P.
4003.6 (limiting the obtaining of information from a treating physician to written consent
or through court-authorized discovery methods) (promulgated "in the wake of Moses",
White v. Behlke, 2004 WL 1570095, 65 Pa. D. & C. 4th 479). Further calling Moses into
question, a subsequent lower-court opinion cited a long line of authority indicating that,
Moses notwithstanding, ex parte contact had long been prohibited in Pennsylvania. Id.
The governing principle cannot be stated better than this Court did in DeBry:
"[U]nder these circumstances [a Rule 506 waiver], a patient must at least be afforded the
opportunity for protection. As part of a therapeutic relationship, a doctor or therapist has
an obligation to protect the confidentiality of his patients that transcends any duty he has
as a citizen to voluntarily provide information that might be relevant in pending
litigation." 2000 UT App 58, «f| 28.
Faced with authority from this Court and the Utah Supreme Court that Rule 506
waivers are not without limits, Barbuto resorts to a state statute that has been expressly
superceded, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4). The subsection provides:
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A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a
civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. However, this privilege
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which the patient places
his medical condition at issue as an element or factor of his claim or defense.
Under those circumstances, a physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or
treated that patient for the medical condition at issue may provide information,
interviews, reports, records, statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the
patient's medical condition and treatment which are placed at issue.
As noted, that statute has been superceded. See DeBry, 2000 UT App 58, \ 24 n. 2
("The statutory privilege has no further effect. Physician-patient and therapist-patient
privileges are now exclusively controlled by Rule 506"). While Barbuto acknowledges
DeBry, he nonetheless argues that "the statute has never been repealed," and that only the
first two sentences of the statute were superceded, not the third. (Appellees' Brief at 18).
There are multiple difficulties with this argument. First, whether the statute has
been repealed is immaterial. It is well known that a number of outdated, unconstitutional,
or otherwise superceded statutes remain on the books. The fact remains that the adoption
of rules of evidence is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not the
legislature.
Barbuto's argument that only part of subsection 4 was superceded is contrary to
the Court's statement in DeBry, and to the advisory committee note accompanying Rule
506, which states that subsection 78-24-8(4) (not "two of its three sentences") were
intended to be superceded by the rule. Additionally, Barbuto reads too much into the
third sentence, which says nothing about non-testimonial disclosures of confidential
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information. Rather, it merely indicates the scope of information that a physician could
disclose when testifying as a witness.
Section 24 of Title 78 addresses, by its terms, "Witnesses." Every provision in
Section 24 deals exclusively with witnesses in court proceedings (e.g., competency to be a
witness, interpreters, subpoenas, rights of witnesses, administering of oaths). Indeed, the
words preceding the language cited by Barbuto state: 'There are particular relations in
which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate.
Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in the following cases[.]" Section
78-24-8 (emphasis added).

The statute addressed only the circumstances when a

physician could provide - in the context of testimony - otherwise privileged medical
information. Thus, not only has the statute been superceded, but it provides no support
for Barbuto's argument.5
Finally, Barbuto claims that he did not breach his duties as a physician because the
Utah State Bar has opined that it is not a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
for attorneys to engage in ex parte communications. That is immaterial, of course—an
opposing attorney owes no duty of confidentiality to a patient. A physician does. An
opposing attorney is not a fiduciary of the patient. A physician is. DeBry had been on
the books for three years when, for financial gain, Barbuto acted directly in contradiction

5

The fact that Section 78-24-8(4) was enacted in the section governing "Witnesses,"
rather than in Title 58, which governs the conduct of health care providers, belies
Barbuto's unsupported assertion that the third sentence is a "substantive" regulation on
the conduct of physicians that cannot be superceded by the Utah Supreme Court.
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to the standards laid out in that case. There are no rules or statutes justifying his alleged
misconduct in this case.
III.

BARBUTO'S ALLEGED ACTIONS VIOLATED THE GENERAL
DUTIES OWED BY A PHYSICIAN TO A PATIENT.

Case law holds that, if a physician learns that his prior diagnosis was wrong or
requires clarification, he has a duty to disclose it to the patient, even if the physicianpatient has since ended. Barbuto himself admits that, "[a]rguably, if there is a change in
information which affects the patient's well-being with respect to conditions being
treated, the duty to inform might continue after termination of the relationship."
(Appellees' Brief at 30). That is what Sorensens are alleging. Barbuto says he concluded
that his prior diagnosis had "created a mythology" in Nicholas Sorensens' treatment - a
change that he was obligated to report (rather than take steps to conceal). Sorensens'
allegations state a claim for negligence.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT SORENSEN
COULD NOT MAINTAIN A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF PRIVACY.

The right of privacy is invaded by, among other things, unreasonable publicity
given to the other's private life, or publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false
light before the public. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988). As Sorensens
noted in their initial brief, it is unclear how many people received the confidential
information. The allegations of the complaint permit a reasonable inference that it was
more than a small group as Barbuto suggests.

17

Additionally, Barbuto's breaches required Sorensens to file his deposition
testimony with the Court in order to obtain partial relief (the exclusion of his testimony).
When an inevitable and reasonable consequence of a breach of confidence is making part
of the information public, a claim should be permitted for breach of privacy.
Finally, Barbuto does not refute Sorensens' argument that no "body count" is
required when a confidence is breached by a fiduciary. See 11 C.J.S. Right of Privacy
and Publicity (2005, § 25). For each of these reasons, the trial court erred in dismissing
Sorensen's claim for invasion of privacy.
In his brief, Barbuto argues that the "judicial proceeding privilege" bars plaintiffs
privacy claims. Barbuto admits that he never raised this issue with the trial court.
(Appellees' Brief at 36) ("the issue of privilege was not argued before the trial court").
However, Barbuto cites Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ^
67, 70 P.3d 17, as authority for this Court to rely on any argument to affirm a dismissal.
While the Bennett court did not indicate whether the alternative ground had been
raised below, appellate courts in Utah have long imposed that requirement. See 438 Main
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 51, 99 P.3d 801, and cases cited (to preserve an
issue for appeal, it must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the court has an
opportunity to rule on the issue; "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the
issue must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority"; issues not raised at trial are usually
deemed waived).
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There are several reasons why Barbuto's new argument should not be heard for the
first time on appeal. It is questionable whether the privilege would extend to professional
witnesses, or to Barbuto's non-testimonial disclosures. It would not apply if Barbuto
acted with malice. It would not apply if the statements were published to anyone who
lacked a legal right to receive them. See DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111,ffif12, 21, 992
P.2d 979. Such issues should be hashed out in the trial court in the first instance (also
affording the plaintiff an opportunity to seek leave to amend if appropriate), rather than
asking this Court to decide them on an incomplete record.
V.

SORENSENS STATE A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

On appeal, Barbuto appears to have abandoned the argument made below that his
conduct could not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
it was fairly debatable. Instead, Barbuto's principal argument is that he is protected from
an IIED claim by the judicial-proceedings privilege.
As noted above, this issue was never raised below, and should not be considered
by the Court. Issues exist regarding Barbuto's status as a paid witness, (in)applicability
of the privilege to Barbuto's informal disclosures, malice, and excessive publication, all
of which render affirmance on this ground inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court to reverse
the judgment of the district court.
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